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Abstract: 
Fragile States are understood as States that are unable or unwilling to exercise 
effective control over part of their national territory. The fragile State’s 
compliance with its international law obligations is therefore reduced due to 
objective factors and this has major impact on international human rights law 
(IHRL) as well. Nonetheless, scholarship has overlooked that fragile States 
may and sometimes do comply with their positive obligations in areas beyond 
their effective control under the evolving, effectiveness-based interpretation 
of IHRL. The paper argues that each of the dominant compliance theories 
only partially explains the factors influencing fragile States’ compliance with 
IHRL: instead of limiting compliance to a monocausal model, both rational 
choices and internal socialisation processes should be taken into account to 
enhance the fragile States’ compliance. The two main schools of thoughts, 
rational and constructivist schools of compliance do provide complementary 
explanations to the questions why and how fragile States can comply with 
their positive obligations under IHRL. 
Rational theories explain that compliance by fragile States with their positive 
obligations in IHRL entails direct benefits, especially in terms of monitoring 
of the human rights situation, well-being of the people in the area and 
international cooperation. Rational interests do not explain however why 
public bodies act in a way favouring human rights protection in the area 
beyond the State’s control, especially if their domestic conducts are not 
reported in international human rights mechanisms. In those cases, 
constructivism may provide complementary explanation: repeated patterns 
of norm-compliance play a critical role in creating a common identity, 
especially domestic actors’ belief in an ideal, active State. 
 
Fragile States are understood as States that are unable or unwilling to exercise 
effective control over part of their national territory. State practice in international 
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human rights law (IHRL) has used the notion of “effective control” over territory as a 
synonym of “actual authority”,1 the main requirement of belligerent occupation within 
the meaning of the 1907 Hague Regulations.2 “Actual authority” has two factual 
criteria: the occupying State has to take physical possession of a land area, making the 
territorial State incapable of exerting its powers,3 and be in a position to exercise its 
authority.4 Due to the State’s lacking enforcement power in the area escaping its 
territorial control, its ability to fulfil its international law obligations is reduced. While 
this reduced ability to comply has major impact on the respect of IHRL as well, the 
evolving interpretation of international human rights treaties requires the State to take 
all available measures within its power to protect human rights in the area.5 
Some fragile States have accepted this evolving interpretation of IHRL and 
taken specific measures within their power to implement their international human 
rights obligations in the area outside their effective control that human rights 
monitoring bodies have sometimes found satisfying the required threshold of positive 
obligations. Far from making any generalisation about a trend of compliance by fragile 
States, the present paper is limited to noting that certain fragile States have taken 
available measures to protect human rights in areas outside their effective control 
despite their reduced effectiveness. Yet, no study has ever interrogated the theoretical 
underpinnings of such compliance. 
While numerous studies have addressed why Western, mainly powerful States 
comply or do not comply with IHRL, few authors have applied compliance theories to 
weak, mainly non-Western States. Fragile States face their inability to perform acts in 
a part of their territory, on the one hand, and the non-compliance by other international 
law subjects de facto controlling the area (another State, multiple States, armed 
opposition groups or an international organisation6), on the other. 
The paper analyses State practice through international human rights 
 
1 Chiragov and Others v Armenia (merits) [GC] (dec), Appl. no. 13216/0516 [2015] III ECtHR 135, 
para 96; Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in Crimea Sevastopol, Doc off HRC UN, 36th 
session, UN Doc A/HRC/36/CRP.3 (25 September 2017), para 38, note 30; Jose Isabel Salas Galindo 
and others v United States (2018), Inter-Am Ct HR report nº 121/18 Case 10.573, Merits, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.169, para 318-319; Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, 
1st ed, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, at 40, 42. 
2 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, UNTC, The Hague, Art 42. 
3 United States Military Tribunal, The Hostages Trial – Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, Law Reports 
of Trials of War Criminals, 1949, vol. 8, at 55; ICRC, 2016 Commentary of Geneva Convention I, 
Article 2, para 304, online: </bit.ly/3aLx5tJ>; Chiragov and Others v Armenia, supra note 1, para 96; 
Sargsyan v Azerbaijan (merits) [GC], Appl. no. 40167/06 [2015] IV ECtHR 1, para 94, 144. 
4 Wilhelm List and Others, supra note 3, at 56; 2016 Commentary of GCI, supra note 3, para 304; The 
Prosecutor v Mladen Naletilić, IT-98-34, Judgement, Trial Chamber (31 March 2003) para 217 (ICTY). 
5 Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras, (1988), Inter-Am Ct HR report nº22/86 Case 7920, Merits, para 175; 
Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia [GC] (dec), Appl. no. 48787/99 [2004] VII ECtHR 1, para 333; 
infra, Section III. 
6 For the classification of all past and contemporary scenarios, see Antal Berkes, International Human 
Rights Law Beyond State Territorial Control, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming) c 1. 
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monitoring mechanisms, including regional human rights courts,7 universal periodic 
treaty monitoring mechanisms8 and UN Charter-based mechanisms9 on compliance by 
States that are expressly recognised as lacking territorial control over part of their 
territory. International monitoring bodies have recognised this factual circumstance10 
in only certain fragile States (especially: Azerbaijan, Colombia, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Republic of Cyprus, Republic of Moldova, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Ukraine) that encountered territorial fragility for a longer period due to an 
enduring armed conflict. 
To explain the reasons of compliance and non-compliance by fragile States, 
the paper applies the two main schools of thoughts, rational and constructivist schools 
of compliance.11 First, the so-called rational or reputational theories focus on the State’s 
self-interests and rationality, coercion, cost-benefit calculations and material incentives 
in choosing compliance.12 As the fragile State encounters a situation of conflict and 
lack of effectiveness, any cooperation with the international community including 
international human rights mechanisms might enhance its likelihood to normalise the 
territorial situation. Second, the so-called constructivist school, however, emphasises 
social learning and socialisation in the State’s choice of compliance.13  
According to constructivists, State authorities might decide to act against the 
State’s interests, as defined in rational models because their norm internalisation, 
culture or belief system dictates it.14 This might apply especially to certain fragile States 
that have adopted and effectively internalised regional human rights treaty obligations. 
Few academic works, mainly in political science, have drawn attention to the 
importance of capacities and the State’s inability to comply with its human rights 
 
7 Especially the ECtHR and the IACtHR. The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights have provided 
relatively scarce case law on the subject matter. 
8 The periodic reports by the fragile States and the concluding observations by the ten UN treaty-based 
bodies (www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx) have been analysed. 
9 Especially reports of special rapporteurs and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). 
10 By using various terms such as “territory beyond the effective control of the government”, “military 
occupation”, “difficulties that the State party has in exercising government powers and control over the 
territory”, “areas under the control of non-State armed groups”, etc. 
11 See this typology of only two models in: Jeffrey T Checkel, “Why Comply? Social Learning and 
European Identity Change” (2001) 55:3 Int Organ 553 at 553–588; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, “How 
to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law” (2004) 54:3 Duke Law J 621 at 
630–631. 
12 Jack L Goldsmith & Eric A Posner, The limits of international law, Oxford, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2005 at 3–10; Markus Burgstaller, Theories of compliance with international law, 
Leiden, Boston, M. Nijhoff, 2005, at 96–97. 
13 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 11, at 635; Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and legality in 
international law: an interactional account, Cambridge studies in international and comparative law 67, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2010 at 12–13. 
14 Harold Hongju Koh, “Jefferson Memorial Lecture - Transnational Legal Process after September 11th 
Lecture” (2004) 22:3 Berkeley J Int Law 337 at 339. 
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obligations,15 as opposed to the dominant scholarship’s focus on unwillingness.16 Those 
authors have, however, ignored that States may and sometimes do comply with their 
positive obligations in areas beyond their effective control under the evolving, 
effectiveness-based interpretation of their positive obligations. The present paper fills 
the scholar gap and argues that each of the dominant compliance theories only partially 
explains the factors influencing fragile States’ compliance with IHRL: instead of 
limiting compliance to a monocausal model, both rational choices and internal 
socialisation processes should be taken into account to enhance the fragile States’ 
compliance. While the analysis of the applicability of all possible theories of 
compliance to the context of fragile States exceeds the limits of the present paper, the 
two main schools of thoughts, rational and constructivist schools of compliance do 
provide complementary explanations to the questions why and how fragile States can 
comply with their positive obligations under IHRL. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II claims that the fragile States’ lacking 
territorial control affects their ability to comply with IHRL. Section III explains that 
despite the factual limitation of fragile States to fully comply with IHRL, since the mid-
2000s, human rights treaty bodies have increasingly required from fragile States a 
proactive conduct consisting of various positive obligations. This evolving 
interpretation relies on the international law standard of due diligence that imposes a 
realistic conduct, in accordance with the State’s capacity. Section IV explains that 
several fragile States have voluntarily accepted the dynamic interpretation of treaty 
monitoring bodies and accepted the positive obligations towards individuals in the area 
beyond their territorial control. To address the reasons and nature of this compliant 
conduct by fragile States, dominant compliance theories provide partial and 
complementary explanations: first, the rational theories (Section V) and second, 
constructivism (Section VI). The analysis of the theoretical and practical impact of 
those schools of thought leads to some concluding recommendations as to the best 
practices to enhance the human rights compliance of territorially fragile States. 
 
I. Territorial Fragility as a Compliance Problem 
Weak or failing States, or nowadays the more common term ‘fragile States’ 
are not legal terms to describe structural problems in the operation and capabilities of 
certain States. While difficult to define in legal terms, State fragility has been subject 
to extensive qualitative and quantitative scholarship. Indicators such as the Failed State 
Index, or its current version the Fragile State Index measure and classify States based 
 
15 Neil A Englehart, “State Capacity, State Failure, and Human Rights” (2009) 46:2 J Peace Res 163–180; 
Thomas Risse & Tanja A Börzel, Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: The New Agenda, in 
Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink (eds), Persistent Power Hum Rights Commit 
Compliance Cambridge studies in international relations 126, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2013, at 63. 
16 E.g. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The new sovereignty: compliance with international 
regulatory agreements, 1st Harvard University Press pbk. ed, Cambridge, Harvard University Press 1998 
at 227, 230; Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 12 at 105. 
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on various key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators 
such as cohesion indicators, economic indicators, political indicators or social and 
cross-cutting indicators.17 When defining a “failing State”, the UN Secretary General 
described a State without “cohesive national authority capable of guaranteeing the 
security of the State and its people in an accountable manner”, where “State authority 
is in the hands of local warlords” not under the unified command and control of the 
government.18 
International law scholarship considers the loss of the State’s effective control 
over a part of its territory as one of the factors of the failure or the weakness of the 
State19 which often exacerbates other geographical, socio-political phenomena such as 
armed conflicts, massive migrations or natural disasters. The State’s lacking effective 
control over part of the national territory entails inherent problems of compliance with 
IHRL. Without physical control over the territory, the State cannot fully protect and 
fulfil human rights of individuals situated in the area beyond its territorial control. For 
instance, State authorities have no access to evidence available in the area, cannot 
investigate and prosecute perpetrators of human rights violations and cannot fully offer 
certain remedies to victims without having the physical contact with them. Because of 
the significant limitation that the lacking territorial control imposes on the State, it is 
unsurprising that various commentators before the mid-2000s held that the State 
exercising no territorial control over part of its territory has no obligations under IHRL 
towards individuals in that region.20 This dominant view has changed since the mid-
2000s, when human rights treaty bodies started to increasingly conceptualise the 
question from a proactive standpoint, imposing positive obligations on fragile States. 
 
II. Interpretation by Treaty Bodies: Positive Obligations 
In their ratification or periodic reporting dialogue, fragile States themselves 
tend to invoke their structured fragility, especially their inability to control their 
territory as a compliance problem. Fragile States expressed this inability in two forms: 
either at the time of the signature or the ratification of the human rights treaty, on the 
 
17 The Fund for Peace "Fragile States Index" (10 April 2019) online: The Fund for Peace 
<fundforpeace.org/2019/04/10/fragile-states-index-
2019/#:~:text=The%20Fragile%20States%20Index%2C%20produced,towards%20the%20brink%20of
%20failure>, at 33. 
18 UN Security Council, Letter dated 16 September 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2013/557 16 September 2013, at 1-2. 
19 Gérard Cahin, “Le droit international face aux ‘États défaillants’” in L'État dans la mondialisation, 
Colloque de Nancy de la société française pour le droit international, acte du 46e colloque de la SFDI, 
Paris, Pedone, 2013, at 59; Neyire Akpinarli, The Fragility of the “Failed State” Paradigm: a Different 
International Law Perception of the Absence of Effective Government, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2010 at 16–17. 
20 Liesbeth Zegveld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law, Cambridge studies 
in international and comparative law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2002 at 210; Gérard 
Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness: Legal Lessons from the Decolonization of Sub-
Saharan Africa, Leyde, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2004 at 284; Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal 
Armed Conflict, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2002 at 142. 
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one hand, or in the periodic reporting procedure, on the other. 
First, States whose central government has lost effective control over a part of 
their territory often made unilateral declarations aimed at excluding the application of 
human rights treaties in their entirety in the given region. Among fragile States, 
Eurasian States of which territory is in part controlled by a de facto regime, and among 
them Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova often had recourse to such 
unilateral declarations by which they intended to exclude the application of the treaty 
in its entirety to the region over which they lost control.21 Ukraine, when it lost 
territorial control over Crimea and certain areas in Eastern Ukraine, made similar 
territorial declarations both to some of its already binding human rights treaties22 and 
to those that it signed or ratified subsequently.23 Treaty monitoring bodies, however, 
rejected the admissibility of those territorial declarations and held that the State cannot 
arbitrarily and unilaterally curtail its jurisdiction by excluding zones or areas from the 
State’s territory.24 Therefore, the territorial declarations of fragile States do not produce 
any legal effect, while the State’s jurisdiction covers the entire national territory.25 
Second, fragile States invoke in periodic reporting procedures and regional 
court procedures the fact that they are unable to control part of their territory.26 In other 
words, even if territorial declarations made at the time of treaty ratification cannot 
exclude the applicability of the human rights treaty in respect of the area, fragile States 
argued that the factual loss of territorial control may nevertheless have such an effect.27 
If one accepts the jurisprudential principle according to which effective control of a 
territory entails jurisdiction,28 one may suppose that reversely, the loss of effective 
 
21 E.g. Optional protocol No. 2 to the CAT (Azerbaijan); CRPD (Azerbaijan); Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966 (Moldova); Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography, 25 May 2000 (Moldova). See United Nations – Treaty Collection; Council of Europe 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (Georgia, Moldova). See Council of Europe 
(CoE) Treaty Office. 
22 Treaty No.112 - Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, CoE, 21 March 1983, ETS no. 112, 
Declaration of Ukraine, 12 October 2015, CoE Treaty Office. 
23 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, New 
York, 19 December 2011 (Ukraine), UNTC A/RES/66/138 (14 October 2014), online: 
<treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-d&chapter=4&clang=_en>. 
24 Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia [GC], Appl. no. 48787/99 [4 july 2001] [decision on the 
admissibility], online: HUDOC <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-5948>, at 20; Assanidze v Georgia [GC], 
Appl. no. 71503/01 [8 April 2004], online: HUDOC <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61875>, para 140; 
Minas Sargsyan v Azerbaijan [GC], Appl. no. 40167/06, [14 December 2011] [decision on the 
admissibility], online: HUDOC <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-108386>, para 69; Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), Concluding observations: Republic of Moldova,  UN Doc 
CRC/C/OPSC/MDA/CO/1, 29 October 2013, para 9. 
25 Further details on territorial declarations in: Berkes, supra note 6 c 2. 
26 E.g. Committee against Torture (CAT), UN Doc CAT/C/SR.1332 (4 August 2015), para 9-10 (Iraq); 
Human Rights Committee (HRC), Fourth periodic reports of States parties due in August 2002, Cyprus, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/CYP/4 (19 March 2013), para 5; The Republic of Moldova: Ilaşcu, supra note 5 para 
300-304. 
27 The ECtHR also examines the two questions separately. Ilaşcu, supra note 5, para 324; Sargsyan 
(admissibility), supra note 24, para 71-76. 
28 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] I.C.J. Reports, at 
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control over an area excludes jurisdiction over the same territory. 
Face to the alleged inability to comply with treaty obligations by fragile States 
in their amputated region, universal treaty monitoring bodies drew diverse conclusions. 
Most reports concluded the State party’s inability to apply the concerned human rights 
treaty (36 out of 108 concluding observations referring to the State’s lacking territorial 
control until 31 May 2020, or 33.3 %).29 Some reports held that the State encounters 
difficulties to implement the human rights treaty on account of the lacking territorial 
control (23 %). Even among the concluding observations talking about the State’s 
incapacity to apply the treaty, only few affirmed expressly either the State’s lack of 
jurisdiction,30 or the difficulty31 to exercise its jurisdiction in the area. As opposed to 
these conclusions, few reports (13.8 %) found that the State continues to have 
jurisdiction and obligations towards individuals situated in the area despite its lack of 
territorial control.32 
This varying practice of concluding observations seemed to change, however, 
from the mid-2000s, as a consequence of the Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In the Ilaşcu case, 
regarding applicants detained by separatist de facto authorities in the unrecognised 
Transnistrian region in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, the ECtHR recognised 
for the first time that a fragile State continues to have positive obligations and 
jurisdiction over human rights violations in an area outside its effective control but 
within its sovereign territory.33 The Court concluded that the State has “a positive 
obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial 
or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in accordance with international 
law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention”.34 This 
judgment largely reflects the decades-long practice of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
which presume the State’s jurisdiction over its entire national territory and research 
how far the State complied with its obligation of due diligence to protect individuals 
 
54, para 118 (“Physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title, is the basis of 
State liability for acts affecting other States.”). 
29 E.g CRC, Concluding observations: Cyprus, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.205 (2 July 2003), para 5; 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Concluding observations: Georgia, 
UN Doc CERD/C/GEO/6-8 (22 June 2016), para 3; CERD, Concluding observations: Republic of 
Moldova, UN Doc CERD/C/MDA/CO/7 (16 May 2008), para 3. 
30 HRC, Concluding observations: Cyprus, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.39 (3 August 1994), para 3; CERD, 
Concluding observations: Republic of Moldova, UN Doc CERD/C/60/CO/9 (21 May 2002), para 3; 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Concluding comments: 
Cyprus, supp no. 38, UN Doc A/51/38 (9 May 1996), 10, para 44. 
31 CRC, Concluding observations: Georgia, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.222 (27 October 2003), para 4; HRC, 
Concluding observations: Georgia, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.75 (5 May 1997), para 3. 
32 E.g HRC, Concluding observations: Georgia, UN Doc CCPR/C/GEO/CO/3 (15 novembre 2007), 
para 6; CERD, Concluding observations: Iraq, UN Doc CERD/C/IRQ/CO/22-25 (11 January 2019), 
para 4; etc. 
33 Ilaşcu, supra note 5, para 331-335. 
34 Ibid, para 331. 
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against third-party violations in areas where the State is absent.35 Beyond regional 
treaty monitoring bodies, universal human rights monitoring bodies also adhered to the 
State’s continued positive obligations regarding an area outside its territorial control. 
Charter-based human rights bodies36 and universal treaty monitoring bodies37 reiterated 
the same standard as Ilaşcu and addressed to the fragile State various positive 
obligations with regard to individuals in the area outside governmental control.38 
The State’s positive obligations in an area beyond its territorial control rely on 
both its residual effectiveness and awareness of the risk of the wrongful act, the two 
instigating the standard of due diligence to protect, prevent and repress wrongful acts 
by third parties.39 Due diligence requires the State to prevent and repress human rights 
violations within its territory.40 Despite the lack of its territorial control, the State can 
take a broad range of political, diplomatic, economic, legislative, judicial, 
administrative or other measures within its power to protect human rights against third 
parties (States or non-state actors). This capacity, also called the ‘capacity to influence’ 
effectively the action of third parties,41 one of the preconditions of the standard of due 
diligence, assesses the actual means in the State’s power to take proactive measures to 
protect human rights. In other words, despite the loss of territorial control, the State 
disposes of both the sovereign title over its territory and certain residual effectiveness 
 
35 E.g. Velásquez-Rodríguez, supra note 5, para 172; Commission nationale des droits de l'Homme et des 
libertés v Chad, Communication no. 74/92, ACommHPR, 18th ordinary session, 11 October 1995, 
para 22. 
36 E.g Human Rights Council, Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since 
September 2014. Report of the UNHCHR, UN Doc A/HRC/39/43 (17 August 2018), para 13; Human 
Rights Council, Situation of human rights in Crimea Sevastopol, UN Doc A/HRC/36/CRP.3 
(25 September 2017), para 41; HRC, Report on the situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine 13 September 2017 to 30 June 2018, 
UN Doc A/HRC/39/CRP.4 (21 September 2018), para 84, note 98; Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mission to the Republic of 
Moldova, UN Doc A/HRC/10/44/Add.3 (12 February 2009), para 6. 
37 HRC, General comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, on the right to life, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36 (30 October 2018), para 22; CEDAW, General 
recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/28 (16 
December 2010), para 5. 
38 E.g HCR, Concluding observations : Republic of Moldova, UN Doc CCPR/C/MDA/CO/2 (4 November 
2009), para 5; CRC, Concluding observations: Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc CRC/C/SYR/CO/5 
(1 February 2019), para 21(f)-(i); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
Concluding observations : Iraq, UN Doc E/C.12/IRQ/CO/4 (27 October 2015), para 5; CEDAW, 
Concluding observations : Syria, UN Doc CEDAW/C/SYR/CO/2 (18 July 2014), para 40(g); Committee 
on Enforced Disappearances, Concluding observations : Iraq, UN Doc CED/C/IRQ/CO/1 
(13 October 2015), para 23. 
39 On due diligence see in detail in: Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, “The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature 
of the International Responsibility of States” (1992) 35 Ger Yearb Int Law 9–51; Berkes, supra note 6 
c 3. 
40 See the general international law formulation of the standard, requiring the protection of the rights of 
other States within the territory of the State: Trail Smelter Case (United States, Canada) (1938, 1941) 
III UNRIAA 1905, at 1965; in the same sense, see Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] 
ICJ Rep 4, at 22. 
41 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, at 221, para 430. 
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in the government-controlled area. As Kelsen duly observed, effectiveness in this 
context, “means only that the principle of effectiveness does not refer to the control of 
the territory but to the efforts to regain such control”.42 Mutatis-mutandis, in IHRL 
effectiveness refers to the capacity to take measures to protect individuals, prevent and 
repress human rights violations, and not to the State’s actual territorial control in the 
region. 
Certain authors in political sciences noted that overall human rights 
compliance of certain fragile States has improved, without the change in the State’s 
effectiveness in the area outside their effective control, by the enhancement of 
capacities in the government-controlled area.43 However, they failed to remark the close 
link between the two: the efforts to regain territorial control and protect human rights 
in the area beyond governmental control suppose measures of legal, political, 
administrative and cultural nature44 taken by the State in the government-controlled 
area. In other words, better human rights compliance supposes enhancement of 
effectiveness by the fragile State. 
At first sight, requiring fragile States to take positive measures regarding 
individuals in an area beyond their effective control might seem contradictory: despite 
the State’s ineffectiveness, it is expected to improve the human rights situation of the 
area. However, the idea that the threshold of positive obligations depends on the 
capacities of the fragile State creates a realistic expectation, in line with the standard of 
due diligence. States are expected to invest in strengthening their effectiveness towards 
individuals in the area beyond their territorial control as far as possible in the given 
circumstances. Consequently, IHRL contributes to the effectiveness of territorial States 
and to the reconstitution of an ideal State, namely, an active State that protects 
individuals in its sovereign territory. 
 
III. Acceptance of Positive Obligations by Fragile States 
The dynamic interpretation of treaty monitoring bodies found positive echo in 
the compliance practice of the concerned States. As a sign of the increasing authority 
of the international case law, several fragile States have accepted their positive 
obligations towards individuals in the area beyond their territorial control.45 They have 
 
42 Hans Kelsen, Principles of international law, New York, Rinehart & Co. 1952 at 289. 
43 Risse & Börzel, supra note 15 at 80. 
44 Velásquez-Rodríguez, supra note 5, para 175; Ilaşcu, supra note 5, para 331. 
45 E.g. Georgia : CEDAW, Combined 4th and 5th periodic reports of Georgia, UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GEO/4-5 (30 October 2012), para 11; CAT, Third periodic report of Georgia, UN Doc 
CAT/C/73/Add.1 (4 July 2005), para 35; Ukraine : HRC, Eighth periodic report of Ukraine, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/UKR/8 (30 January 2019), para 61; Republic of Moldova : HRC, Third periodic report of the 
Republic of Moldova, UN Doc CCPR/C/MDA/3 (17 March 2016), para 77; Republic of Cyprus : 
Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Submission by Cyprus, UN Doc 
APLC/MSP.12/2012/WP.5 (4 October 2012), paras 9-10; Democratic Republic of the Congo : HRC, 
Reply of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the List of Issues, UN Doc CCPR/C/COD/Q/4/Add.1 
(9 October 2017), para 54. 
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adopted a series of positive measures to protect human rights in the area outside their 
effective control,46 which can be considered as the adequate implementation of IHRL. 
Nonetheless, the fact that in some periodic reports the same States also denied their 
positive obligations47 shows that the evolving interpretation has not yet soundly 
stabilised.  
Certain quantitative and qualitative data suggest that the international 
community increasingly accepts and monitors the positive obligations of fragile States 
regarding the area beyond their control. Limited international case law of regional 
human rights courts has brought the compliance of fragile States with their positive 
obligations in the frontline of discussions. For instance, until the end of 2019, the 
ECtHR found the Republic of Moldova to have violated the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) regarding Transnistria only in three out of 33 
judgments on the merits,48 presenting a non-compliance rate of 9 %. The same non-
compliance rate with regard to the entire territory was 87 % in average since Moldova’s 
ratification of the ECHR in 199749 and 72 % in 2019.50 Until the end of 2019, the 
ECtHR found Ukraine to have violated the ECHR regarding its areas beyond its 
effective control (Eastern Ukraine, Crimea) in none of the two judgments decided on 
the merits (out of five finalised cases).51 While Ukraine’s data should be considered 
carefully due to the low number of finalised cases from the regions outside 
governmental control, Moldova’s record suggests a deliberate policy of compliance. 
The limited case law, however, does not allow evaluating the compliance record of 
fragile States: thousands of applications submitted against Georgia (Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia) and Ukraine (Crimea and Eastern Ukraine) are pending before the 
ECtHR for long years,52 as the Court has adjourned individual applications while they 
 
46 E.g. Georgia : CERD, Sixth to eighth periodic reports of Georgia, UN Doc CERD/C/GEO/6-8 
(31 October 2014), para 74-90; Republic of Moldova : HRC, Third periodic report of the Republic of 
Moldova, supra note 45, at 14-17; Iraq : CERD, Combined twenty-second to twenty-fifth periodic reports 
submitted by Iraq, UN Doc CERD/C/IRQ/22-25 (22 November 2017), paras 25-29; Ukraine : CAT, 
Seventh periodic report of Ukraine,  UN Doc CAT/C/UKR/7 (11 February 2019), paras 45-71. 
47 HRC, Fourth periodic reports of States parties: Cyprus, supra note 26, para 5; HRC, Report of the 
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review (RWGUPR) : Cyprus, UN Doc A/HRC/41/15 
(5 April 2019), para 24; HRC, Replies of Georgia to the list of issues, UN Doc CCPR/C/GEO/Q/4/Add.1 
(28 April 2014), para 5. 
48 Ilaşcu, supra note 5; Braga v the Republic of Moldova and Russia (judgment), Appl. no. 76957/01, [17 
October 2017] online: HUDOC <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-177650>; Negruța v Russia and 
the Republic of Moldova (judgment), Appl. No. 3445/13, [17 September 2019] online: HUDOC 
<hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-195847>. 
49 ECtH, "ECHR Overview 1959-201", February 2020, 9, online (pdf):  
 <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592019_ENG.pdf> (5 March 2020). 
50 ECtHR, "Violations by Article and by State", 2019, 2, online (pdf):  
 <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_2019_ENG.pdf> (5 March 2020). 
51 ECtHR, Khlebik v Ukraine (judgment), Appl. no. 2945/16,[25 July 2017]; Tsezar and Others v Ukraine, 
Appl. nos. 73590/14 et al., [13 February 2018]. 
52 On 31 August 2018, 1,723 individual applications against Georgia were pending, lodged by persons 
affected by the hostilities in South Ossetia at the beginning of August 2008 : ECtHR, "New inter-State 
application brought by Georgia against Russia", Press release, ECHR 287 (2018), 31 August 2018; On 
11 September 2019, more than 5,000 individual applications concerning events in Crimea, Eastern 
Ukraine and the Donbass region submitted against Ukraine, Russia or Ukraine and Russia were pending : 
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are legally and factually inked to highly politicized interstate applications.53 Moreover, 
individuals from regions outside governmental control encounter systemic difficulties 
in having access to international courts.54 What the limited case law nonetheless 
indicates is an increased acceptance of their positive obligations by certain fragile 
States. 
Some qualitative examples from the practice of human rights periodic 
monitoring mechanisms corroborate the claim that certain fragile States take their 
positive obligations regarding the area outside their control seriously. For instance, 
human rights monitoring bodies welcomed the efforts of Georgia in the domain of the 
protection of IDPs potentially or actually escaping the area beyond its control,55 in the 
restitution of property and compensation for those who had left the government-
controlled area and moved to the area beyond government control and in facilitating 
the visit of international monitoring bodies,56 or its support of health and education 
services in the regions beyond its control.57 Regarding the policies of the Moldovan 
government on Transnistria, the Human Rights Committee welcomed “the commitment 
expressed by the State party’s delegation during the dialogue to take all appropriate 
measures to ensure the effective protection of human rights in that region”.58 Treaty 
monitoring bodies welcomed the implementation of a Colombian legislative act that 
ensures full reparation for the victims of the internal armed conflict59 or the introduction 
of the Early Warning System of the Colombian Ombudsman, designed to prevent 
displacement and other serious human rights violations.60 Despite the instances of 
recognised compliance, most concluding observations of universal treaty bodies stress 
the domains of non- or partial compliance with the expected positive obligations.61 
 
ECtHR, "Grand Chamber hearing on inter-State case Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea)", Press release, 
ECHR 309 (2019), 11 September 2019. 
53 ECtHR, "ECHR to adjourn some individual applications on Eastern Ukraine pending Grand Chamber 
judgment in related inter-State case", Press release, ECHR 432 (2018), 17 December 2018; the pending 
cases include: Georgia v Russia (II), Appl. no. 38263/08; Georgia v Russia (IV), Appl. no. 39611/18; 
Ukraine v Russia (re Crimea), Appl. no. 20958/14; Ukraine v Russia (II), Appl. no. 43800/14; Ukraine 
v Russia (V) (re Eastern Ukraine), Appl. no. 8019/16; Ukraine v Russia (VII), Appl. no. 38334/18; 
Ukraine v Russia (VIII), Appl. no. 55855/18. 
54 Antal Berkes, “Concurrent Applications Before the European Court of Human Rights: Coordinated 
Settlement of Massive Litigation from Separatist Areas” (2018) 34:1 Am Univ Int Law Rev 1–88 at 3-4. 
55 E.g. Walter Kälin, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of 
internally displaced persons, Mission to Georgia (21 to 24 December 2005), UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2006/71/Add.7 (24 March 2006), para 53.  
56 HRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 40 of the Covenant: Third 
periodic report of Georgia, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2483 (19 October 2007), paras 37-38 (Mr Kälin). 
57 CRC, Concluding observations: Georgia, UN Doc CRC/C/GEO/CO/4 (9 March 2017), para 4. 
58 HRC, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of the Republic of Moldova, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/MDA/CO/3 (18 November 2016), para 5. 
59 Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Concluding observations on the report submitted by Colombia 
under article 29 (1) of the Convention, UN Doc CED/C/COL/CO/1 (27 October 2016), para 35. 
60 HRC, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Colombia, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/COL/CO/6 (4 August 2010), para 13. 
61 Ibid para 5-6, 18; CRC, Concluding observations: Georgia, supra note 57, para 4; HRC, Concluding 
observations: Iraq, UN Doc CCPR/C/IRQ/CO/5 (3 December 2015), para 20; CAT, Concluding 
observations: Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc CAT/C/SYR/CO/1/Add.2 (29 June 2012), paras 21, 23(d); 
CEDAW, Concluding observations: Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc 
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These quantitative and qualitative examples, far from proving any general 
trend among all fragile States, demonstrate that certain fragile States have been able to 
adopt a series of positive measures to comply with their obligation to protect human 
rights in the area outside their effective control. While examples of non-compliance or 
partial compliance are still preponderant in the periodic concluding observations, it is 
sound to say that fragile States contest the required threshold of proactive conduct 
rather than the validity of the norm. The next two sections provide for the theoretical 
underpinning of this evolving State practice. 
 
IV. Rational Theories 
The so-called rational theories such as rational choice or reputational theories 
focus on the State’s self-interests and rational costs-benefits in choosing compliance: 
the State chooses compliance with international rules because it advances its national 
interests but it does not need to claim that the national interest itself serves its 
compliance.62 This school of thought assumes that States are rational, self-interested 
actors who seek to maximize their own gains or payoffs, while they have no innate 
preference for complying with international law.63 According to rational scholars who 
focus on reputation, defined as judgments about an actor’s past behavior used to predict 
future behavior,64 the reputation of the State’s conduct influences its choices: a decision 
to violate international law will increase today’s payoff but reduce tomorrow’s 
benefits.65 The rational theory comprehensibly explains States’ compliance in areas 
such as international financial and economic law where cooperation and coordination 
entails direct costs and benefits,66 but are hardly obvious in other fields not 
characterised by reciprocity. Especially in IHRL, reciprocity or traditional rational 
choice mechanisms can hardly explain States’ compliance.67 As rational choice theories 
exclude that altruistic considerations such as an internalized desire to follow the law 
justify compliance,68 rational interests and external reputation of the State’s conduct are 
the only decisive factors. In the case of the fragile State’s choice to comply with positive 
obligations, such rational considerations are far from obvious. Moreover, certain 
rational choice theorists are sceptical towards IHRL as universal human rights treaties 
 
CEDAW/C/COD/CO/8 (6 August 2019), para 10, 11(a); CESCR, Concluding observations: Ukraine, 
UN Doc E/C.12/UKR/CO/7 (2 April 2020), para 29-32, 44-45. 
62 Burgstaller, supra note 12 at 97. 
63 Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory, Oxford University Press 
2008, at 17; Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 12 at 13 ("International law is [...] endogenous to state 
interests"). 
64 Guzman, supra note 63 at 33. 
65 Markus Burgstaller, “Amenities and Pitfalls of a Reputational Theory of Compliance with International 
Law” (2007) 76:1 Nord J Int Law 39–71 at 61. 
66 Ibid at 71. 
67 Harold Koh, “Internalization Through Socialization” (2005) 54:4 Duke Law J 975–982 at 979; Alex 
Geisinger & Michael Stein, “Rational Choice, Reputation, and Human Rights Treaties” (2008) 106:6 
Mich Law Rev 1129–1142 at 1134. 
68 Geisinger & Stein, supra note 67 at 1131–1134; Guzman, supra note 63 at 17. 
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lack effective or reliable coercive enforcement mechanism69 such as an international 
human rights court. Their overall conclusion is that the foreseeable benefits do not 
change States’ compliance with IHRL, as human rights–abusing States can ratify the 
treaties with little fear of adverse consequences, while States with a higher culture of 
human rights do not have to change their behaviour only because of their party status 
to human rights treaties.70 Despite the scepticism of authors representing rational 
compliance school on the importance of costs and benefits of States’ compliance with 
UN treaty mechanisms, this section argues that the treaty compliance by fragile States 
is both costly and entails direct benefits in terms of international monitoring (A), the 
well-being of the people (B), and international cooperation (C). 
 
A. Monitoring as a Benefit 
Analysts of rational theories consider universal treaty monitoring mechanisms 
generally weak, as their public information on the States parties’ human rights practices 
does not specifically evaluate compliance with the treaty obligations nor is it well 
publicized.71 Empirical studies demonstrate that publicity of human rights violations by 
domestic authorities increases human rights compliance of the State, but it does not 
necessarily depend on the given State’s party status to IHRL treaties.72 Neither human 
rights NGOs and journalists reporting on human rights abuses nor other governments 
distinguished between signatories and non-signatories when they monitor human rights 
abuses.73 Therefore, adepts of rational theories may legitimately ask whether fragile 
States have any interest in participating in universal treaty mechanisms. 
Despite the scepticism of rational scholars about the effectiveness of universal 
human rights treaty monitoring procedures, fragile States’ practice shows that 
compliance with the positive obligations to report on, monitor and investigate human 
rights violations entails direct benefits. In an area where agents of the fragile State have 
no physical access, the State party is not in a position to provide first-hand information 
on the situation of human rights.74 Nonetheless, as a compliance measure to strengthen 
their jurisdiction in the area outside their control, some fragile States set up a 
governmental body charged with the monitoring and reintegration of the area.75 As 
 
69 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 12 at 119–120. 
70 Ibid at 120. 
71 Oona Hathaway, “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” (2002) 111:8 Yale Law J 1935–2042 
at 2022–2023; Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 12 at 120. 
72 Ellen L Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, “International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America” 
(2000) 54:3 Int Organ 633–659 at 645–647. 
73 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 12 at 122, 125–126. 
74 E.g. HRC, Fourth periodic report of Cyprus, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.3143 (24 March 2015), para 33 
(Republic of Cyprus). 
75 E.g. in Georgia, the actual Office of the State Minister of Georgia for Reconciliation and civic equality : 
CERD, Fourth and fifth periodic report due in 2008, Georgia, UN Doc CERD/C/GEO/4-5 (25 February 
2011), para 6; in the Republic of Moldova, the Reintegration Office : HRC, Third periodic report of the 
Republic of Moldova, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.3309 (21 October 2016), para 42-43; in Serbia, the 
Coordination Center for Kosovo and Metohija, transformed into the Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, 
and then into the actual Office for Kosovo and Metohija; In Ukraine, the Ministry of Temporarily 
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those government bodies can only provide remote monitoring of human rights in the 
area, based on indirect sources, the State has a primary interest in inviting and 
promoting international monitoring.76 
A further, less costly measure of compliance in terms of human and financial 
resources is the mere invocation of and protestation against the unlawful territorial 
situation in human rights mechanisms. For instance, without truly detailing the positive 
measures taken to protect human rights in the area, Azerbaijan regularly uses periodic 
reporting mechanisms as a forum for its territorial claim against Armenia whom it 
considers as an occupying power in Nagorno-Karabakh.77 Other fragile States such as 
Ukraine or Georgia have decided to exhaust all available international judicial and non-
judicial mechanisms to challenge human rights violations and, indirectly, the alleged 
occupation of their territory by Russia.78 Those examples indicate that the mere 
publicity of the human rights treaty mechanisms, even without the latter’s competence 
to issue binding decisions, constitutes an argumentative benefit for the fragile State. 
 
B. Well-being of the People in the Area 
Rational choice advocates accept that certain national interests can justify 
compliance even in the field of IHRL. The State’s interest in the well-being of persons 
under its control is one of such rationales.79 However, this does not necessarily apply 
to individuals living outside the State’s territorial control but still within its territory, in 
a region beyond its territorial control. However, even authors representing the rational 
choice theory admit that the State can have a lower interest in protecting foreign 
citizens, especially coreligionists, co-ethnics, and co-nationals living in other States, or 
of States with whom they have colonial, historic or sentimental ties, or trade relations.80 
Between the two groups of persons, individuals under the government’s control and 
foreign citizens, one can perfectly recognize that a State does have rational interests in 
protecting the human rights of its nationals in an area outside its effective control as 
their sort might be of major concern for the domestic electorate. 
Nonetheless, protection of nationals only partly explains compliance, 
especially regarding situations where the population of the area beyond the State’s 
 
Occupied Territories and IDPs, see Human Rights Council, National report submitted in accordance 
with paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: Ukraine, UN Doc 
A/HRC/WG.6/28/UKR/1 (31 August 2017), para 6. 
76 E.g. CEDAW, Combined 4th and 5th periodic reports of States parties due in 2011, Georgia, UN Doc 
CEDAW/C/GEO/4-5 (30 October 2012), para 9; HRC, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review, Georgia, UN Doc A/HRC/31/15 (13 January 2015), para 29 (Georgian government). 
77 E.g. HRC, Third periodic report of States parties: Azerbaijan, UN Doc CCPR/C/AZE/3 
(10 December 2007), para 10-15; HRC, Fourth periodic reports of States parties due in 2013: 
Azerbaijan, UN Doc CCPR/C/AZE/4 (17 March 2015), paras 4-5, 192, 347. 
78 HRC, Fifth periodic report submitted by Georgia under article 40 of the Covenant, due in 2019, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GEO/5 (28 April 2020), paras 108-110 (detailing the interstate applications initiated by Georgia 
against Russia before the ECtHR), 184-193 (reporting on the human rights situation in the areas outside 
the government’s control); on the interstate applications: ECtHR, ECHR, supra note 53. 
79 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 12 at 109. 
80 Ibid at 109–110. 
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territorial control has been subject to forced population changes. Examples include 
Northern Cyprus or Nagorno-Karabakh, both populated by settlers who are non-
nationals of the fragile State, Cyprus and Azerbaijan, respectively. Even in other 
regions, citizens of neighbouring countries, foreign fighters or other immigrants have 
diversified the ethnic and national landscape of the area.81 As a consequence, beyond 
nationals of the fragile State, residents holding other nationalities have settled in the 
area. What is appealing from some fragile States’ declarations is their readiness to fulfil 
their positive obligations with regard to all individuals rather than only their citizens 
residing in the area.82 The Iraqi government also expressed this policy to protect 
individuals irrespective of their nationality when it declared that “Iraq is making every 
endeavour to fulfil its moral and legal obligation under the provisions of international 
treaties to protect the lives and future of children by shielding them to the greatest 
possible extent from armed conflict and all acts of violence”.83 
This policy to protect non-nationals in the area is all the more justified that 
nationals of the State and their descendants might have lost their identity documents 
while they forcefully obtained a new nationality due to the massive distribution of 
passports by an occupying or outside State.84 The policy of extraterritorial 
‘passportization’, for example that of Russia executed in Transnistria, South-Ossetia, 
Abkhazia or Crimea, is presumed as unlawful in international law,85 as it is likely to 
violate the prohibition of discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin and to lead to 
the loss of the nationality of the territorial State.86 On the one hand, protecting foreign 
citizens in the area beyond the fragile State’s control may not, however, a priori serve 
any direct interest of the State. On the other hand, it must also be admitted that certain 
fragile States distinguish between the protection of their citizens and settlers whom they 
consider illegal.87 In such scenarios, the fragile State has to accommodate its positive 
obligations under IHRL, on the one hand, and the general international law obligation 
not to recognise as lawful a situation created by serious breaches of peremptory norms, 
 
81 E.g. HRC, Fifth periodic report submitted by Georgia under article 40 of the Covenant, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/GEO/5 (28 April 2020), para 187. 
82 E.g. HRC, Third periodic report of the Republic of Moldova, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.3309 (21 October 
2016), para 58 (Republic of Moldova); CESCR, Replies by the Government of Cyprus to the list of issues 
(E/C.12/CYP/Q/5), UN Doc E/C.12/CYP/Q/5/Add.1 (24 March 2009), para 59; Fourth report submitted 
by Cyprus, Framework Convention for the protection of National Minorities, Doc. 
ACFC/SR/IV(2014)007 (29 April 2014), para 98 (freedom of movement of foreign citizens). 
83 HRC, Replies of Iraq to the list of issues, UN Doc CCPR/C/IRQ/Q/5/Add.1 (27 August 2015), para 78. 
84 Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report - Universal Periodic Review: Georgia, July 
2010, online: www.refworld.org/docid/4c4d2bfa2.html (30 June 2020), at 5. 
85 Anne Peters, “Extraterritorial Naturalizations: Between the Human Right to Nationality, State 
Sovereignty and Fair Principles of Jurisdiction” (2010) 53 Ger Yearb Int Law 623–725 at 693, 718. 
86 Ibid at 671, 702. 
87 E.g. Nils Muižnieks (Commissioner for Human Rights of the CoE), following his mission in Kyiv, 
Moscow and Crimea, from 7 to 12 September 2014, CommDH(2014)19 (27 October 2014), para 54 
(Ukraine restricting foreign citizens’ freedom of movement from and to Crimea); Thomas Hammarberg 
(Commissioner for Human Rights of the CoE), Special follow-up mission to the areas affected by the 
South Ossetia Conflict, Doc. CommDH (2008) 33 (21 October 2008), para 80 (idem by Georgia). 
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on the other.88 As the accommodation between the two rules in tension is unclear, 
rational theories recognise that the cost of the failure to take positive measures of 
protection vis-à-vis settlers may be relatively low provided that the State is able to 
persuade others that its conduct was actually in compliance with a reasonable 
interpretation of the law.89 The ambiguity of the norm will incite the fragile State to 
provide an explanation in the human rights mechanism for why its behaviour is in 
compliance with the given treaty; therefore, cost-benefit calculations will still matter. 
 
C. International Cooperation 
Another interest that rational choice theorists apply to IHRL is that human 
rights compliance acts as a signal to other States which are likely to seek cooperation 
with compliant partners.90 The so-called signalling theory assumes that persons 
undertake the costs of compliance in exchange of future benefits in terms of trust and 
cooperation from the part of other persons.91 Applying this theory to IHRL, the cost 
would be the fragile State’s efforts to take measures to protect individuals in the area 
beyond its territorial control, while the benefit is its future cooperation with other 
States.92  
To a certain extent, fragile States may expect foreseeable gains in terms of 
international cooperation: they may expect development aid, humanitarian or economic 
assistance and even military cooperation with other States and international 
organisations. An increasing number of international organisations and States require 
human rights compliance as a prerequisite of their development aid programmes. 
However, those conditional benefits require proven engagement in improving human 
rights records by the fragile State, not only in the government-controlled area but also 
regarding the area beyond its control.93 Therefore, such conditional benefits might be 
costly in terms of capacities that the fragile State should invest in its human rights 
system. 
In case of the most serious massive human rights violations, the international 
community is obliged to cooperate with and assist the fragile State that is unable to 
control an area within its territory. This follows first from the concept of ‘Responsibility 
 
88 Articles on Responsibility of states for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, (2001) YbILC 
vol II, Part Two, Article 41(2), at 39, para 4; the underlying peremptory norm is the absolute prohibition 
on the transfer into the occupied territory of the occupier’s nationals. See Geneva Convention IV, 
Articles 27, 49; Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press 2005, at 462-463 (Rule 130). 
89 Guzman, supra note 63 at 96. 
90 David Moore, “A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance” (2003) 97:2 Northwest Univ Law 
Rev 879–910 at 882–888. 
91 Eric A Posner, “The Signaling Model of Social Norms: Further Thoughts Response” (2002) 36:2 Univ 
Richmond Law Rev 465–480 at 476. 
92 Moore, supra note 90 at 879–880. 
93 E.g. EC, Definitive adoption of the European Union's general budget for the financial year 2013 
(2013/102/EU, Euratom), [8 March 2013] OJ L 66, at II/840. 
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to protect’, a theory according to which it is the territorial State’s primary responsibility 
to guarantee human rights in its territory.94 Under the concept, the international 
community is obliged to assist the unable State to protect the population from the 
commission of the gravest human rights violations (genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity).95 In case of those gravest human rights 
violations, fragile States have often expressed request for international assistance in the 
protection of human rights in the area.96 Especially the hope to invite peacekeeping 
forces under the control of an international organisation as a real alternative to territorial 
control by other actors constitutes an incentive for which fragile States expressed their 
willingness to comply with IHRL.97 As seeking the assistance of other States and 
international organisations is one of the available measures through which the State can 
fulfil its positive obligations,98 its reiteration in periodic reporting mechanisms is both 
a relatively costless expression of compliance and an expected benefit. 
It follows that international cooperation, depending on the type of the human 
rights violations in the area, may require certain investments by the fragile State in its 
human rights system or relatively costless international claim for assistance. The 
benefit, international cooperation, enhances the fragile State’s effectiveness in terms of 
financial, humanitarian, economic, military capabilities. 
All the above-mentioned factors provide certain benefits for fragile States, and 
thus constitute interest-based explanations for compliance. They contribute either to the 
fragile State’s claim for territorial sovereignty as a litigation strategy or enhance its 
effectiveness, as a material element.  
 
V. Constructivism 
Rational theories do not entirely explain all conducts of fragile States, 
especially domestic conduct not reported in international human rights mechanisms that 
complies with IHRL. None of the above-mentioned rational interests fully explains why 
public bodies act or do not act proactively to prevent and mitigate human rights 
violations in the area beyond governmental control. Constructivists challenge rational 
 
94 See the second pillar of the theory of ‘Responsibility to protect’ : Resolution 60/1 : 2005 World Summit 
Outcome, UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005), para 138; and the numerous resolutions of the 
Security Council : UN Doc S/RES/1653 (27 January 2006), para 10; UN Doc S/RES/1674 (28 April 
2006), para 9 of the Preamble, etc.; For a complete list see the website of the International Coalition for 
the Responsibility to Protect, www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ (25 February 2014). 
95 General Assembly, Implementing the responsibility to protect, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc 
A/63/677 (12 January 2009), para 28-48 (Pillar two). 
96 E.g. HRC, Replies of Iraq to the list of issues, supra note 83, para 81; CEDAW, Summary record of the 
892nd meeting (Chamber B), UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.892 (B) (14 August 2009), para 70 (Azerbaijan); 
HRC, Third periodic report of the Central African Republic, UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.3695 (11 March 
2020), para 22 (Central-African Republic). 
97 E.g. HRC, RWGUPR: Ukraine, UN Doc A/HRC/37/16 (3 January 2018), para 8. 
98 Ilaşcu, supra note 5, para 346-347; Ivanțoc and Others v Moldova and Russia (judgment), Appl. no. 
23687/05, [15 November 2011] online: HUDOC <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-107480>, para 109; 
CRC, Concluding observations: Cyprus, UN Doc CRC/C/CYP/CO/3-4 (24 September 2012), para 53. 
 Unedited version – June 2021 Published in: Hors-série (2021) Revue québécoise de   
                                                   droit international 
theories and see social interaction as central to shaping human conduct. Instead of 
interests as the origin of legal obligations, constructivists claim that through interaction 
and communication based on norms, States generate their identities and interests.99 
For constructivists, public authorities of fragile States may decide to act 
against the State’s interests, as defined in rationalist models, because their norm-
internalisation, culture or belief system dictate it.100 Instead of an expected benefit in 
terms of the State’s sovereignty or effectiveness, State authorities act, under the 
constructivist theory, out of the “internalization of the norms’ generalized validity 
claim”.101 Constructivists call socialization processes the interactions through which 
pro-norm behaviour becomes internalized.102 Socialization is the result of interactions 
of the main law-making subjects, States, intergovernmental organizations, and other 
non-state actors such as NGOs, citizens, and the media.103 To scrutinize how far those 
actors have internalized the fragile States’ positive obligations regarding areas outside 
their territorial control, the contribution of each of the major international actors will 
be questioned: State authorities (A), regional human rights monitoring bodies (B), the 
international community including intergovernmental organisations and third States 
(C), and the civil society understood as NGOs, citizens and the media (D). 
 
A. State Authorities 
Constructivists examine how far State authorities interact with other 
international and domestic actors in internalizing a given norm. As explained above, 
fragile States have declared their commitment to positive obligations regarding the area 
beyond their control but have not necessarily fully complied with the expected 
threshold of diligence. Various domestic authorities have contributed to the 
compliance, at least partial, with those obligations: the executive including especially 
 
99 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 13 at 13; Harold Hongju Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” 
(1997) 106:8 Yale Law J 2599–2659 at 2633–2634; Sarah Elizabeth Kreps & Anthony Clark Arend, 
“Why States Follow the Rules: Toward a Positional Theory of Adherence to International Legal 
Regimes” (2006) 16:2 Duke J Comp Int Law 331–414 at 344-345 (criticising that constructivists are not 
quite able to predict when this change in identity will take place). 
100 Koh, supra note 14 at 339. 
101 Friedrich V Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1989, at 48. 
102 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments” (2001) 45:4 Int Stud 
Q 487–515 at 492. 
103 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 13 at 75; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting 
Human Rights through International Law, Oxford University Press 2013, at 12-13 (distinguishing 
between macro and micro level developments in State socialisation). 
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investigative and diplomatic authorities, courts,104 legislation,105 ombudsman office106 
may equally play a role in preventing, repressing and mitigating human rights violations 
in the area beyond governmental control. The principle of territorial integrity, which is 
in accordance with international law standards,107 is without doubt one of the main 
constitutional law foundations underlining this domestic practice.  
For constructivists, a norm only acquires legality if a “shared understanding” 
makes it intelligible, that is beyond the formal lawmaking and the rule’s validity, a 
community of practice builds up a practice of the norm’s legality in legal interactions.108 
As for constructivists it is practice rooted in the criteria of legality that grounds 
continuing obligation, interactionalism explains the formulation of customary law as 
arising from state practice plus opinio juris, that is the States’ belief in the binding 
character of the custom. 109 Whereas Georgia went as far as to speak about its positive 
obligations towards its separatist regions “imposed by the Convention and the 
customary international law”,110 the above-mentioned inconsistencies in the views of 
States and the treaty bodies make it premature to speak about an established custom. 
Considering the evolving State practice and the gaps in the scope of positive 
obligations, one can nonetheless regard the territorial State’s positive obligations as a 
progressive development of international law. 
 
B. Regional Human Rights Monitoring Bodies 
The case law of regional monitoring bodies has decisively influenced the 
domestic case law of certain fragile States. For example, in accordance with the case 
law of the ECtHR, domestic courts of the Republic of Cyprus engaged the responsibility 
of the Cypriote State for its failure to comply with the procedural limb of the right to 
life and awarded damages to the claimants, relatives of missing persons who 
disappeared during the Turkish invasion.111 In Moldova, criminal courts quash the 
 
104 E.g. by quashing decisions of the unrecognised authorities of the area: ECtHR, Mozer v the Republic of 
Moldova and Russia (judgment) [GC], Appl. no. 11138/10, [23 February 2016], para 153. 
105 E.g. Address of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the United Nations, other international organisations 
and national parliaments on condemnation of violation of the rights of indigenous peoples in the Russian 
Federation and territories of Ukraine temporarily occupied by Russia, in: Volodymyr Yelchenko, Letter 
dated 25 June 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/73/915–S/2019/526 (27 June 2019), Annex. 
106 E.g. Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia, 12 June 2014, Submission to the Fourth report of 
Georgia under the ICCPR. 
107 Venice Commission, Opinion on ‘whether the decision taken by the Supreme Council of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea in Ukraine to organise a referendum on becoming a constituent territory of the 
Russian Federation or restoring Crimea’s 1992 Constitution is compatible with constitutional 
principles, Opinion no. 762/2014, CDL-AD(2014)002  [21 March 2014], para 17. 
108 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 13 at 72. 
109 Ibid at 47. 
110 CRC, Written replies by the government of Georgia to the list of issues (CRC/C/GEO/Q/3), UN Doc 
CRC/C/GEO/Q/3/Add.1 (20 May 2008), para 41. 
111 E.g. Palma v Attorney General (28 november 2012), Nicosia Court, Appeal Chamber, Case no. 
6661/2001, (Cyprus) available in English at 
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judicial decisions of Transnistrian de factoauthorities if their procedure was vitiated or 
contrary to article 6 of the ECHR, referring to the positive obligation under the Ilaşcu 
judgment,112 and open criminal proceedings against the de facto judges who breached 
those human rights. The ECtHR considered those measures as satisfying Moldova’s 
positive obligations113. 
In Colombia, courts act in line with the Inter-American case law when 
deciding cases about guerrilla regions. The case law of the IACtHR has strongly 
influenced the State responsibility cases of the Colombian Council of State:114 when 
the court has no evidence on the active participation (support, authorisation) of the State 
authorities in the human rights violations committed by non-state armed groups, it 
examines whether the violations are due to an omission of the authorities. If the latter 
were unable to foresee the risk of the violation, the responsibility of the State is not 
engaged.115 However, when both the activity and the military objectives of the 
guerrillas in a given region were of public knowledge – this was the case in the 
‘demilitarised enclave’116 –, the Council of State concluded that the argument of force 
majeure was not admissible and the predictability of the violations justified the 
engagement of the State’s responsibility for its own omission.117 Like the IACtHR, the 
Council of State stresses that through the non-respect of the obligations of due 
diligence, the territorial State itself created the situation of risk.118 
 
 <www.truthnowcyprus.org/index.php/en/announcements/item/21-recentcaselaw> (3 March 2019); 
While the example concerned missing Greek Cypriots who disappeared in the government-controlled 
area, domestic courts apply the same approach to missing Turkish Cypriots. HRC, Information received 
from Cyprus on follow-up to the concluding observations, UN Doc CCPR/C/CYP/CO/4/Add.1 (15 
March 2015), para 5. 
112 E.g. Supreme Court of the Republic of Moldova : Petiş Mihail et al., no. 1re-130/12, 10 July 2012; Eliţov 
Eduard Petru, no. 1re-486/12, 18 December 2012; Ursu Alexandru Timofei, no. 1re-4/13, 22 January 
2013. 
113 Ilaşcu, supra note 5, para 346; Ivanțoc, supra note 98, para 110; Mozer v the Republic of Moldova and 
Russia (judgment) [GC], Appl. no. 11138/10, [23 February 2016], online: HUDOC 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-168541> para 153. 
114 Lina Marcela Escobar Martínez, Vicente F Benítez-Rojas & Margarita Cárdenas Poveda, “La influencia 
de los estándares interamericanos de reparación en la jurisprudencia del Consejo de Estado Colombiano” 
9:2 Estud Const 165–190. 
115 Consejo de Estado, Luis Miguel Fernández Vega c. La Nación, Ministerio de Defensa, Ejercito Nacional 
y Policía nacional, no. 11837, Sala de lo Contencioso administrativo, Sección tercera, 8 May 1998, 18 
(Colombia). 
116 The ‘demilitarised enclave’ of Colombia between 1998 and 2002 was an area of 42 000 square kilometres 
from where the Colombian armed forces withdrew and where the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) had become the de facto authority. Colombia, Resolución n° 85, 14 October 1998, 
Departamento Administrativo de la Presidencia de la República y los Ministerios del Interior, Justicia y 
Defensa; Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights 
Situation in Colombia, UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/15 (8 February 2001), para 126-127. 
117 E.g. Consejo de Estado, Martha Morales y Otros c. Nación, Ministerio de Defensa nacional y Policía 
nacional, no. 5001-23-31-000-1994-4398-01(13553), Sala de lo Contencioso administrativo, Sección 
tercera, 20 September 2001, at 27-28; Blanca Rosalba Prieto Rubio y otros c. Nación-Ministerio de 
Defensa y Otro, no. 20001-23-31-000-1997-03529-01(18274), Sala de lo Contencioso administrativo, 
Sección tercera, 18 February 2010, at 30. 
118 E.g. José Ignacio Ibañez Diaz y Otros, no. 52001-23-31-000-1997-08789-01(15838, 18075, 25212 
acumulados), Sala de lo Contencioso administrativo, Sección tercera, 25 May 2011, at 91, para 60; 
Numael Barbosa Hernandez y Otra, no. 50001-23-31-000-1999-00286-01(25949), Sala de lo 
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In those cases, compliance by the domestic authorities does not necessarily 
serve the direct interests of the State. Paying compensation to victims or investigating 
about human rights violations occurring in the area beyond the State’s control do not 
serve the budgetary or administrative interests of the fragile State. Such measures rely 
much more on an internalised pattern of belief in the positive obligations under the 
regional human rights treaty than on rational interests or coercion. In fact, each of the 
above-mentioned States presents a good example of norm internalization. In the 
Republic of Moldova, regional organisations such as the Council of Europe and the 
OSCE have provided since the time of the Ilaşcu judgment regular training and 
assistance for local judges and prosecutors.119 In Colombia, judges of the supreme 
judiciary such as the Council of State or the Constitutional Court are “groups of 
progressive lawyers”, mainly trained in the United States and Europe, who have 
constructed the IACtHR’s jurisprudence as a source of constraining authority.120 
Constructivism, furthermore, explains what identity regional human rights 
bodies contribute to. One of the main rationales of the fragile States’ positive obligation 
is the concept of an ideal State under the standard of due diligence. This foresees a 
proactive State that cares for individuals even in areas beyond its territorial reach, in 
accordance with its effective powers. As the Inter-American Court and the Commission 
formulated, the State has a role of ‘guarantor’, initially used to express the specific 
position of the State vis-à-vis persons deprived of their liberty by State authorities.121 
Later, the IACtHR slightly extended the notion to human rights obligations of the State 
vis-à-vis several categories of persons in a position of vulnerability,122 whereas in its 
recent case law, it understands under this notion the position of the State towards any 
person coming within its jurisdiction.123 The Colombian case law has internalised the 
same notion and invokes it whenever it applies the State’s positive obligations towards 
victims of guerrilla regions.124 Less expressly, the Moldovan case law regularly refers 
to the State’s obligations under Article 1 of the ECHR to adopt all kinds of available 
measures - economic, diplomatic or legal or otherwise - in order to ensure that 
 
Contencioso administrativo, Sección tercera, 12 June 2013, at 47-49 (Colombia) (the creation of the 
‘demilitarised enclave’ and the lack of measures of precaution). 
119 CoE, Moldova: Stock-taking of co-operation with the Council of Europe, Report prepared by the 
Secretariat subsequent to a visit to Chisinau on 27- 30 September 2005, SG/Inf(2005)20-rev, 
21 December 2005, paras 20, 26. 
120 Alexandra Huneeus, “Constitutional Lawyers and the Inter-American Court’s Varies Authority The 
Variable Authority of International Courts” (2016) 79:1 Law Contemp Probl 179–208 at 187–192, esp. 
189. 
121 Case of Neira-Alegría et al. v Peru (1995), Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 21, Annual Report of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 1995 OAS/Ser.L/V/III.33/doc.4 (1996), para 60. 
122 Such as human rights defenders working in NGOs: Case The Inter-ecclesial Commission on Justice and 
Peace, Order of 22 November 2010, Request for Provisional measures, para 23; or children: Case of the 
Río Negro Massacres v Guatemala (2012), Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 250 (Preliminary objection, 
merits, reparations and costs), para 142. 
123 Case of the 19 Merchants v Colombia (2002), Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No 93 (Preliminary Objection), 
para 183. 
124 E.g. Blanca Rosalba Prieto Rubio, supra note 117, para 2.3; Gloria Amanda Orjuela Grimaldo y Otros, 
no. 73001-23-31-000-1999-1250-01 (19.920), Consejo de Estado, Sala de lo Contencioso administrativo, 
Sección tercera, 28 January 2012, at 30-31 (Colombia). 
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individuals’ Convention rights are respected in Transnistria.125 The concept of an ideal, 
active State creates a common legal identity of individuals both in the area outside the 
fragile State’s control and in the government-controlled area. The norm of obedience 
to regional human rights standards, if consistently followed as a pattern, might therefore 
create a common identity in those regions.126 For instance, in Moldova, confidence-
building measures construct that common identity in the two borders of the Dnistru 
River among judges, lawyers and prosecutors to improve their professional knowledge, 
skills and experience in implementing the ECHR at the national level.127 Facilitating 
such patterns of compliance leads to a solidification of the norm-conformity, human 
rights culture and a regional identity of the addressees. 
 
C. The International Community 
In line with the evolving interpretation of human rights monitoring bodies, 
certain international organisations such as the Council of Europe128 and the United 
Nations, especially the UN Security Council129 or the Human Rights Council130 adopted 
recommendations reiterating the fragile States’ positive obligations vis-à-vis 
individuals in areas beyond their territorial control. Especially the first pillar of the 
concept ‘Responsibility to protect’, the State’s primary responsibility to guarantee 
human rights in its territory has broadened the international community’s acceptance 
of those positive obligations.131 The European Union, as a regional organisation of 
economic integration, also called upon the Republic of Moldova as an associated State 
“to take concrete steps to improve the livelihoods of the population” in the area beyond 
its territorial reach.132 However, it has not systematically recommended  the same 
obligation vis-à-vis its other associated States such as Georgia, Syria, or Ukraine that 
 
125 Petiş Mihail et al., supra note 112; Ursu Alexandru Timofei, supra note 112. 
126 Mike Burstein, “The Will to Enforce: An Examination of the Political Constraints upon a Regional Court 
of Human Rights” (2006) 24:2 Berkeley J Int Law 423–443 at 442. 
127 CoE, “Online courses on Human Rights for judges, prosecutors and lawyers from Moldova”, press 
release, Chisinau, 11 December 2017, online: <www.coe.int/en/web/chisinau/confidence-building-
measures-across-the-river-nistru/dniester/-/asset_publisher/sCMGySdz2KIl/content/online-courses-on-
human-rights-for-judges-prosecutors-and-lawyers-from-moldova?inheritRedirect=false> (16 March 
2020). 
128 CoE Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2028 (2015), The humanitarian situation of Ukrainian 
refugees and displaced persons, 27 January 2015, para 14; CoE Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 
2198 (2018), Humanitarian consequences of the war in Ukraine, 23 January 2018, paras 11.4, 11.15. 
129 SC, Resolution 2259, UN Doc S/RES/2259 (23 December 2015) on Libya, para 13 (“Calls upon the 
Government of National Accord to promote and protect human rights of all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction”). 
130 Human Rights Council, Res. 42/2. Human rights situation in Yemen, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/42/2 (2 
October 2019), para 7 (adopted by a vote of 22 to 12, with 11 abstentions); HRC, Res. 30/18. Technical 
assistance and capacity-building for Yemen in the field of human rights, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/30/18 
(12 October 2015), para 7 (adopted without a vote). 
131 Supra note 94. 
132 EC, Conclusion of an association agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, 
European Parliament non-legislative resolution of 13 November 2014, OJ C 285/2, 5 August 2016, 
para 33. 
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have lost territorial control over part of their territory. 
Some third States, not affected by the territorial conflict confirmed their shared 
understanding about the fragile State’s positive obligations regarding individuals in the 
area beyond governmental control.133 Nonetheless, the fact that various other third 
States134 and the fragile State themselves135 often presented views that ignored those 
positive obligations shows the somewhat limited consensus or awareness of the 
international community on the evolving interpretation. 
 
D. Civil Society 
For constructivists, the question of how far the norm internalisation has been 
effective is not limited to the conduct of State authorities. A new standard is internalized 
by a wide range of actors: the shared understanding of a norm is generated from 
epistemic communities, that is knowledge-based networks that enjoy authority due to 
their expertise and impartiality, and create policy-relevant knowledge.136 Those 
epistemic communities might instigate the procedure of norm internalisation through 
promotion of interactions that ultimately occur amongst individuals or groups of 
people.137 Especially NGOs influence State compliance by their reporting, monitoring 
and awareness-raising activities.138 
Unlike rational theories, constructivism accepts that the interactions of non-
state actors can lead to a new interpretation of an existing treaty norm through 
subsequent practice.139 This fits to the commonly accepted view according to which the 
conduct of non-state actors may be relevant when assessing the subsequent practice of 
States parties to a treaty.140 The more actors of the civil society invoke the fragile State’s 
positive obligations in domestic and international interactions, the more they contribute 
to the internalisation of the evolving interpretation in IHRL. 
In regions beyond State territorial control, the proactive litigation activity of 
 
133 E.g. RWGUPR: Republic of Moldova, UN Doc A/HRC/34/12 (21 December 2016), paras 121.173-175 
(Romania, Czechia, Georgia); RWGUPR: Republic of Moldova, UN Doc A/HRC/19/18 (14 December 
2011), para 73.63 (Canada); RWGUPR: Ukraine, UN Doc A/HRC/37/16 (3 January 2018), paras 71 
(Switzerland), 116.63 (Georgia), 116.109 (UK); RWGUPR: Georgia, UN Doc A/HRC/31/15 (13 
January 2015), paras 71 (Poland), 116.20 (Lithuania); RWGUPR: Syrian Arab Republic, UN Doc 
A/HRC/34/5 (27 December 2016), paras 109.24-109.25 (Islamic Republic of Iran), 109.128 (Namibia). 
134 RWGUPR: Georgia, UN Doc A/HRC/17/11 (16 March 2011), para 50 (USA); RWGUPR: Iraq,  UN 
Doc A/HRC/28/14 (12 December 2014), para 127.156 (Italy); RWGUPR: Syrian Arab Republic, supra 
note 133, para 109.141 (Hungary). 
135 Supra note 47. 
136 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 13 at 59; Harold Hongju Koh, supra note 99 at 2648. 
137 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 13 at 58–61; Courtney Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International 
Human Rights Tribunals: The Problem of Compliance, Cambridge Studies in International and 
Comparative Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2014 at 37-38 (calling the procedure 
"socialisation" into the community's norms). 
138 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 16 at 269–270. 
139 Brunnée & Toope, supra note 13 at 50. 
140 ILC, Draft conclusions on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the 
interpretation of treaties, with commentaries, UN Doc A/73/10 (2018), at 36, Conclusion 5(2). 
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certain NGOs has largely contributed to the shared understanding on fragile States’ 
obligations.141 In periodic reporting mechanisms, civil society submissions on the 
fragile States’ reports rarely address human rights problems specifically in the region 
beyond State territorial control.142 Areas where egregious violations of international 
humanitarian law and IHRL took place such as the territory controlled by the so-called 
Islamic State, however, provoked various shadow reports addressing the State’s 
positive obligations.143 
In certain cases, the State intervened to protect human rights in the region 
beyond its effective control only under the pressure from the civil society.144 For 
instance, after years of successive Transnistrian applications filed with the ECtHR 
against the Republic of Moldova, the Moldovan government accepted that the effective 
protection of human rights in the area outside its control can only be achieved hand in 
hand with a genuine civil society in the region, “international partners”, especially those 
involved in the settlement process (including third States and international 
organisations),145 NGOs and mass media.146  
 
141 See e.g. the role of the Moldovan NGO Promo-LEX in the Transnistrian case law of the ECtHR: Promo-
LEX, "Representatives of EIN member Promo-LEX visit Strasbourg to raise awareness of important 
cases" (19 March 2019), online : Promo-LEX <promolex.md/14794-representatives-of-ein-member-
promo-lex-visit-strasbourg-to-raise-awareness-of-important-cases/?lang=en> (22 June 2020); 
successful applications include: ECtHR, Negruța v Russia and the Republic of Moldova (judgment), 
Appl. no. 3445/13, [17 September 2019] online: HUDOC <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-195847> 
(violations by both Moldova and Russia); Vardanean v the Republic of Moldova and Russia (judgment), 
Appl. no. 22200/10, [30 May 2017] online: HUDOC <hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-173802> 
(violations by Russia); the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union in Eastern Ukrainian cases: Olena 
Protsenko (UHHRU), "No control should not amount to no responsibility: Khlebik v Ukraine", 16 
February 2018, online: Ukrainian Helsinki Human rights Union <helsinki.org.ua/en/articles/olena-
protsenko-uhhru-no-control-should-not-amount-to-no-responsibility-khlebik-v-ukraine/> (2 June 2020); 
Khlebik, supra note 51 (no violation by Ukraine); the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre in 
Caucasian cases, e.g. in Nagorno-Karabakh :EHRAC, "EHRAC and Yale Law School submit third-party 
intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh right to life cases", 14 January 2020, online: EHRAC 
<ehrac.org.uk/news/ehrac-and-yale-law-school-submit-third-party-intervention-in-nagorno-karabakh-
right-to-life-cases/> (20 June 2020). 
142 See however e.g. Joint submission of Georgian Centre for Psychosocial and Medical, Rehabilitation of 
Torture Victims (GCRT), Human Rights Center (HRC) et al., June 2014, Submission to the Fourth report 
of Georgia under the ICCPR, at 2-3. 
143 E.g. civil society submissions to the fifth report of Iraq under the ICCPR: Alkarama Foundation, Iraq: 
Shadow report, 25 September 2015, at 5, 8; MADRE, IWHR Clinic (CUNY), Seeking accountability 
and demanding change: A report on women’s rights violations in Iraq, October 2015, at 33, 47; 
Alkarama Foundation, Submission to the CAT on the initial report of Iraq, 13 July 2015, at 6-7 ; Miriam 
Puttick/Minority Rights Group International & Ceasefire Centre for Human Rights, No Place to Turn: 
Violence against women in the Iraq conflict, February 2015, at 34. 
144 Promo-Lex/National Endowment for democracy, Civil society report for the Review of the Third 
Periodic Report of Moldova (CAT/C/MDA/3) at the 62th session of the CAT, November 6–December 6, 
2017, para 16; another good example is the role of the civil society in the case law of the Colombian 
Council of State and Constitutional Court. Huneeus, supra note 120 at 189. 
145 RWGUPR: Republic of Moldova, supra note 133, paras 16, 69-70. 
146 Ibid para 66; For instance, in 2006, the Moldovan government set up the National Referral System for 
Assistance and Protection of Victims and Potential Victims of Trafficking as a framework for co-
operation between governmental and non-governmental bodies covering the entire national territory, 
including Transnistria. Report concerning the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on 
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In summary, constructivism explains how progressive development of 
international law such as the evolving interpretation of fragile States’ positive 
obligations is created through a pattern of interactions by various actors. Constructivists 
encounter, however, difficulties to explain instances of non-compliance. For 
constructivists, non-compliance occurs not because of the calculated weighing of costs 
and benefits of compliance but instead because of insufficient information or capacity 
on the part of the State.147 They admit that the State’s deficit in domestic regulatory 
capacity, scientific and technical judgment, bureaucratic capacity, and fiscal resources 
do limit the compliance with positive obligations.148 The constructivist model also fails 
to predict which norms will become internalized through socialisation,149 and how far 
fragile States not parties to regional human rights treaties with a binding monitoring 
mechanism internalise the evolving interpretation of positive obligations. Despite those 
limits, constructivism provides a feasible explanation of existing patterns in domestic 
practices, such as those in certain State parties to regional human rights treaties with a 
solidifying international case law. Furthermore, the constructivist suggestion to provide 
facilitation and capacity building as the most effective response to capacity 
limitations150 fully applies to fragile States. The more State authorities and the civil 
society benefit from the international community’s technical assistance and capacity 





Fragile States are unable to fully satisfy their obligations under IHRL for 
objective reasons, especially due to their lacking territorial control over a part of their 
territory. Their positive obligations are therefore reduced and interpreted under the 
standard of due diligence, expecting a realistic conduct in the given circumstances. 
Despite their reduced capacity, certain fragile States have made significant efforts in 
areas outside their effective control to fulfil their international human rights obligations 
and have sometimes been found to satisfy the required threshold. 
To address the reasons and nature of the conduct of fragile States, existing 
compliance theories can provide partial and complementary explanations. Going 
beyond the use of only rational or constructivists theories, various authors concluded 
that compliance is not mono-causal, but multi-causal that relies on both rational choices 
of States and internal socialisation processes.151 The study of the positive obligations 
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of fragile States under IHRL in areas beyond their territorial control confirms those 
hybrid approaches. 
Rational theories explain that compliance by fragile States with their positive 
obligations in IHRL is both costly and entails direct benefits, especially in terms of 
monitoring of the human rights situation, well-being of the people in the area and 
international cooperation. Those factors provide benefits and require certain 
investments by the fragile State in its human rights system or relatively costless 
international claims for assistance. From the point of view of rational theories, the 
international community and especially human rights monitoring bodies should stress 
those benefits while addressing realistic recommendations to fragile States. 
None of the above-mentioned rational interests explains why public bodies act 
in a way favouring human rights protection in the area beyond the State’s control, 
especially if their domestic conducts are not reported in international human rights 
mechanisms. In those repeated cases of compliance, constructivism may provide 
complementary explanation: repeated patterns of norm-compliance play a critical role 
in creating a common identity, especially domestic actors’ belief in an ideal, active 
State. Constructivism explains why the facilitation of norm internalisation matters: by 
diffusing awareness of various domestic actors of the State’s positive obligations, the 
international community contributes to compliance. Capacity building, technical 
assistance and training of legal practitioners might all enhance compliance by fragile 
States, without the need to search for benefits outside the State’s legal system. Those 
measures of norm internalisation should expand to all stakeholders of the domestic legal 
system: the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of State authorities, and the 
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